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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

OREGON SHORT LINE RAILROAD
COMPANY, a corporation and UNION
PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a
corporation,
Plaintiffs,

-vs.MURRAY CITY, a municipal corporation, and STATEWIDE PLUMBING
& HEATING C0l\1P ANY, INC., a corporation,
Defenxlarnts.

Case No. 8122

REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANT

In this Reply Brief Appellant will use the subtitles
of Respondent's Brief as appropriate.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent on page three makes the statement that
at the time the railroad was constructed "the land was
then all public domain, • • • ".
The fact is that the land was not then public do-
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main. The portion patented to Andrew Cahoon was sold
to him :May 31, 1869. The land patented to Christian
Berger was sold to hiln ~fay 7, 1869. The land patented
to James Randle was sold to him on May 1, 1869. The
land patented to Peter Hanson was sold to hin1 on August 10, 1869.
Respondent also on page three states that the property claimed by the railroad is fenced on both sides and
has been since 1920. There is nothing in the evidence as
to who fenced the property in question and the same
statement, of course, would be applicable to 2nd West
Street, i.e., 2nd West is now fenced on both sides. On
page four counsel states: "There is no evidence as to
when the school on 61st South Street was first constructed." The only school on 61st South is the Liberty
School which is located East of the site occupied by the
24th District School which was also known of as the
Winchester School. The Stipulation of Counsel (R. 102)
is that 61st South was not cut through when the Winchester School was constructed and that the records of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints show
that the Winchester School was constructed in 1874 (R.
103).
ARGUMENT
PRESCRIPTIVE USE

Such rights as the Appellant has in 2nd West Street
between 53rd and 64th South Streets, it holds for the
benefit of all members of the public. These rights as
well as the rights of the public to the street were acquired
long before 1\furray City was incorporated.
2
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There is no question between the parties hereto
that there is now a street extending from 53rd South
to 64th South known of as 2nd West Street and there is
no question between the parties hereto but what the
rights of the public in and to the use of that street antedate the year 1900. The only question involved in this
litigation is the na,ture a,nd extent of the public's right iln
2nd vV est Street.
As stated in Appellant's brief, Appellant claims the
public acquired its rights in and to what is now known
of as 2nd West Street while the same was still public
domain and that those rights gave to the public full and
complete ownership of the roadway which was then four
rods wide.
Appellant claims that the Deeds obtained by the
railroad fron1 the abutting property owners were acquired after the road had been established and hence
were taken subject to the public's existing right to the
use of the four rods for a road.
Appellant does not clai1n the public acquired its
right by prescription.
EFFECT OF RECITALS IN ANCIENT DEEDS

There being no question between the parties hereto
but what the public does have a road, now known of as
2nd VVest Street between 53rd South and 64th Streets,
the only question before the court being the extent of the
right of the public in and to said road, the Deeds frmn
Handle to Lovendahl and Randle to VVinchester, Hansen
to Steffenson and Hansen to l\f eyer, as described on page

3
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five of Appellant's Brief, were admissible even under
Respondent's own citation, that such ancient Deeds are
admissible"* * * when accompanied by possession "" * '"'".
The last clause of the cited section 9-11 of 20 Am. Jur.
reads:
"* * * recitals in ancient deeds are admissible
to establish the extent of the property conveyed or
the location of disputed boundary lines."
Clearly, the public has been in possession of the
street and its rights are derived, not fro1n Deed, not hy
prescription, not by condemnation, but under and pursuant to the Act of Congress of 1866 (43 U.S.C.A. 932).
Respondent makes some point of the fact that the
Plat Exhibit D-12 which platted these original Deeds does
not line up the boundary lines of 2nd West Street exactly as they are today. This court has had sufficient
experience with the discrepancies which occurred in original surveys that this argument should carry no weight.

Roach v. Dahl
84 Utah 377, 35 P 2d 99::3
Reese v. Murdock

(Utah 1952) :243 P 2d !J-1-8
OFFICIAL HIGHWAY MAP AND OFFICIAL MURRAY
CITY PLAT DO NOT DISPROVE EXISTENCE AND USE OF
2nd WEST AS A PUBLIC ROADWAY OR STREET PRIOR
TO 1900.

Exhibit P -34 being the official highway map of Salt
Lake County adopted under Section 1122, Revised Statutes of 1898, shows the existence of the road in question.
It is highway No. 10. Counsel makes some point of the
fact the map does not show the Oregon Short Line Rail4
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road tracks running down the center of the road. This
map was not adopted as a railroad map and does not
purport to have been prepared for the purpose of showing the location of railroads. There is no evidence that
the railroads were ever surveyed by the map maker or
that the map was ever intended to accurately show the
course of the railroad. The evidence is that there never
has been a North - South road West of State 'Street except 2nd West Street running between 53rd and 64th
South Street. The evidence would indicate that at the
time the 1nap was made, and prior thereto, that Route
10 did extend South of 64th South Street. The Deed from
Hansen to Meyer dated December 16, 1874, conveys a
tract of land South of 64th South and one of its courses
runs to the East line of a four rod street which must have
been the same extension of 2nd West as shown on the
map of 1898. The fact that 2nd West South of 64th
South has apparently been abandoned, offers no succor
to Respondent.
SECTION 43 U.S.C.A. 932, GRANTING RIGHTS OF WAY
"FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF HIGHWAYS OVER PUBLI·C LANDS" DOES NOT APPLY TO RAILROADS, AND THE
PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST OF THE PLAINTIFFS
HEREIN DID NOT ACQUIRE A VALID RIGHT OF WAY
THEREUNDER.

Counsel wishes to point out as set forth in the fore
part of this Reply Brief that the lands in question were
not public domain at the time the railroad was built, the
records of the Bureau of Land 1Ianagement show the
lands had been sold to the settlers prior to the construction of the railroad.

5
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Appellant agrees with Respondent that
Hastings & Dakota R. Co. v. Trhitney
132 U.S. 357, 10 S. Ct. Ll :2, 33 L. Ed. 363
correctly holds and states the law that a valid homestead
entry is a sufficient appropriation of land to segregate
the homestead tract from the public domain and such
entry precluded any subsequent grant by Congress in any
manner. The lands in question having been sold before
the railro·ad was built, the railroad could not take advantage of the Act of 1866 as a basis of obtaining a right
to construct a railroad along 2nd West Street. Appellants 1naintain that the fact that the homesteaders, by
conveyances, executed within a period of four to seven
years of their purchase of the land, in their Deeds to
purchasers, made reference to the existence of this road,
is, in view of the short time between purchase and sale,
excellent proof that the public had acquired, before their
purchase from the government, such a right.
We are talking about a time more than eighty years
removed and no man now lives with a personal memory
of what happened in 1869 or 1871 or even 1874 along 2nd
vVest Street. But it seems clear, that when these homesteaders who acquired this property by patent, within a
year or two, convey away a portion of their land, and in
tlie conveyances refer to the existence of a "four rod
county road" that not only did the road exist at that time,
but that the right, which they so identified, was superior
to their right under the patent.
Counsel puts great stress upon the opinion of Judge
Cooley in the case of Flint & P.llf. Ry. Co. v. Gordon, 2
G
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N.vV. 648 (:Mich., 1879). In this case the railroad was
built across the homesteader's land before the property
was sold to the homesteader. The Hastings case hereinbefore cited and cited by Respondent, shows the inapplicability of the Flint case to the facts at bar. Counsel
also cites the case of:

Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Richter
148 P 478, Sup. Ct. of N.1L (1915)
as following Judge Cooley's decision. The headnote in
this case reads :
"An entryman of coal lands of the United
States who has filed a declaratory statement in
the United States Land Office, under the provisions of sections 2347-2349, R.S.U.S. (sections
4659-4661), has a possessory right to the land of
such a character as to render unlawful an entry
thereon by a railroad corporation for railroad
purposes, previous to condemnation proceedings.
This case cites with approval the following cases:
Red River, etc. R. Co. v. Sture
32 :Minn. 95, 20 N.,V. 229.
Wallowa County v. Wade
43 Or. 253, 72 P. 793.
Tholl v. K oles
65 Kan. 802, 70 P 881.
~lcAllister v. Okanogan Co.
51 Wash. 647,100 P 146.
all in support of the proposition that the grant under the
Act of 1866 takes effect as of the date of acceptance and
does not take precedence over the rights of the settler
on unsurveyed public lands. See also :
City of Butte v. JI!Iikosowitz
39 nf ont. 350, 102 P 59B
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Should the court conclude that the public's right in
and to the section of 2nd West in question was acquired
only by prescription, nevertheless such interest gives to
the City the right to the use of the sub-soils for the installation of a sewer. See 44 Am. J'ur. 341, 127 A.L.R.
521, and
Penrn Railroad. Co. v. Breckenriilge
60 N.J. Law 583,38 Atl. 740 (1897)
where the court said:
"Thus an easement acquired by prescription
in a railroal right of way has been held not to give
a railroad company the right to prevent the
laying of pipes below the surface."
See American Law of Property, Vol. II, page 486:
"Where the creation of a public highway operates to vest in the public merely an easement of
way rather than the fee, a problem arises as to
the uses by the public that come within the exercise of this easement of passage. It has been said
that the easement acquired by the public 'include·s
every reasonable means for the transmission of
intelligence, the conveyance of persons and the
transportation of comn1odities.'
''Where the use of the highway under a franchise from the municipality or state involves the
sub-surface of the way, there is a conflict between
this use by the public and the rights of the owner
of the fee to utilize the sub-soil under the way.
Generally, the use of the sub-surface of a public
highway for the construction of sewers, water
pipes, gas or electric conduits has been held to be
within the scope of the public easement of passage,
where the utilities a.re for the benefit of the imInediate surrounding community."

8
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This court held that the Public Service Commission
has jurisdiction over a railroad crossing public streets
but that the City still has jurisdiction over the sub-soils
at railroad crossings. See
Provo City v. Dept. of Business Regu.Za.tion
117 Utah 607, 218 P 2d 675

CONCLUSION
The problem of establishing a right in the public
created more than eighty-five years ago creates evidentiary problems. Still Appellant maintains that the
four deeds from the homesteaders, as described on page
five of Appellant's Brief, are excellent evidence that the
public right to a road had vested at the time those deeds
were executed and that the homesteaders considered
the rights of the public in the road to be superior to
theirs. The fact that the Trustees of the 24th District
School constructed a public schooJ on the East side of
this road in 1874 is rather excellent evidence tha.t at tha.t
time the public road existed four rods wide with the
railroad track down the middle. The fact that a portion
of the road on the East side was still used in the 20th
Century is important and once having been established
could only be abandoned by order of the Board of County
Comrnissioners or other cmnpetent authority (Section 271-3, U.C.A., 1953). There is no evidence of such action
by the County Cornmissioners or anyone else.
':.Che fact that the railroad ultimately obtained deeds

to a portion of the road can have no bearing upon the
right of the public to the full enjoyment of the road. Sec9
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tion 27-1-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides that:
"The public acquires only the right of way
and incidents necessary to enjoying and maintaining it. A transfer of land bounded by a highway passes the title of the person whose estate is
transferred to the middle of the highway."
but this certainly does not mean that the public, through
its duly constituted representatives, cannot utilize that
road for the installation of sewers, water mains, gas
mains, electric power lines and telephone lines where they
all constitute modern methods of transporting and conveying things necessary to the public welfare in the
manner established and accepted in modern society.
It is respectfully submitted that Respondent is entitled to no relief by its cross appeal and the Findings
and Decree should be corrected in the manner set forth
in Appellant's Brief.
Respectfully submitted,
D. HOWE MOFF'AT
WENDELL C. DAY
Attorneys for Appellants
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